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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 08-1180
                              
CHANG HAO LIN-LIN,
                Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                            Respondent
                              
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A98 715 368)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Alberto J. Riefkohl
                              
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 5, 2010
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 13, 2010 )
                              
OPINION
                              
PER CURIAM
Chang Hao Lin-Lin petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”).  For the reasons below, we will deny the petition for review.
Lin-Lin, a native of China, entered the United States in December 2004.  He was
2charged as removable as an alien who entered without being admitted or paroled.  See
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)]. 
He conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Specifically, he argued
that as the spouse of a woman who had been forced to have an IUD inserted and undergo
two abortions, he qualified as a refugee under the Act.  Following both abortions, Lin-Lin
became “angry” and “extremely upset,” and went to the family planning office to protest. 
The first time, Lin-Lin “quarreled” with the family planning authorities.  As a result, he
was detained for two days and “beaten up,” resulting in leg “injur[ies] and bleeding.” 
Lin-Lin went to his village doctor, who treated him with medicine.  After learning of his
wife’s second forced abortion, Lin-Lin returned to the family planning office and was
again “beat[en] . . . up badly.”  He also had to pay fines totaling 8000 RMB. 
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Lin-Lin’s applications, concluding that he
was not credible.  On appeal, the BIA assumed Lin-Lin was credible, but held that he
could not base his own asylum claim on the forced abortion and contraception of his wife. 
The Board further determined that the harm Lin-Lin suffered as a result of other
resistance to China’s family planning policies was not so severe as to amount to
persecution under the Act.  The BIA also rejected Lin-Lin’s claim for withholding and
relief under the CAT.  Lin-Lin filed a timely petition for review.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to INA § 242 [8 U.S.C. § 1252].  Because the BIA
3independently assessed the record, we review only the BIA’s final order of removal.  See
Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 2003).  We use a substantial evidence
standard to review factual findings, Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.
2003), including findings concerning an applicant’s past persecution or “well-founded
fear of future persecution,” Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under the
substantial evidence standard, findings are upheld “unless the evidence not only supports
a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir.
2001).  We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Briseno-Flores v. Att’y
Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007).  
An applicant may demonstrate eligibility for asylum by showing either past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.  See INA
§ 101(a)(42)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)].  Significantly, “persecution connotes
extreme behavior, including threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic
restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.”  Ahmed v. Ashcroft,
341 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted).  It “does not include all treatment
that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”  Id.
(quotation omitted).
The spouses of those who have been persecuted by coercive population control
policies are not automatically eligible for asylum.  Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147
4(3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that there is no automatic refugee status for spouses of
individuals subjected to coercive population control policies).  Based on the statutory
definition of “refugee” under INA § 101(a)(42) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)], we concluded
in Lin-Zheng that refugee status extends only to the individual who had been subjected to
an involuntary abortion or sterilization procedure, had been persecuted for failing or
refusing to undergo such a procedure, or had a well-founded fear of such persecution in
the future.  See id. at 156.  Lin-Lin implicitly acknowledges this, but argues that he
established past persecution based on his own resistance to China’s family planning
policy.  See id. at 157 (noting that spouses remain eligible for relief if they qualify as a
refugee under § 1101(a)(42) based upon their own persecution, or well-founded fear of
persecution, for “other resistance” to a coercive population control program).  As
evidence of persecution, Lin-Lin points to the fines, detention and beatings, and
psychological harm brought on by his wife’s abortions and forced contraception.
While Lin-Lin’s complaints about his wife’s abortions to family planning officials
likely constitute “other resistance,” the record does not compel a finding that his
experiences based on that resistance rise to the level of persecution.  Lin-Lin claimed that
he paid fines totaling 8000 RMB.  He did not allege, however, that those fines were so
onerous that they threatened his life or freedom.  See Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 168
(3d Cir. 2005).  Moreover, the short detention and beatings were not sufficiently severe to
constitute persecution, particularly when Lin-Lin’s injuries required only medicine from
5the village doctor.  See Kibinda v. Att’y Gen., 477 F.3d 113, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2007)
(holding that a single detention and beating requiring a few stitches and leaving a scar
was not “severe enough to constitute persecution under our stringent standard”).  Lin-Lin
also alleged that he was “angry” and “extremely upset” as a result of his wife’s forced
abortions and contraception.  “[A] finding of past persecution might rest on a showing of
psychological harm.”  Ouk v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 108, 111 (1st Cir. 2006).  But, even
assuming that a spouse’s emotional suffering remains a cognizable basis for asylum
following Lin-Zheng, 557 F.3d at 156, we conclude that the record here does not establish
that Lin-Lin suffered psychological harm rising to the level of persecution.  See Jiang v.
Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141-43 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding no past persecution where forced
abortion resulted in illness and diminished health to petitioner’s mother, imposing
“‘anguish’ and ‘economic loss’” to him).  Additionally, Lin-Lin argued that the BIA
failed to consider whether the cumulative effect of his experiences constitute persecution. 
We disagree.  The BIA found that Lin-Lin “has not shown that the level of harm that he
suffered on account of his ‘other resistance,’ which consisted of a 2-day detention, a
beating that caused bleeding to his legs, and the imposition of a fine, was so severe as to
amount to persecution under the Act.” 
Because Lin-Lin cannot satisfy the asylum standard, he cannot satisfy the more
difficult withholding of removal standard.  See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469-70
(3d Cir. 2003).  Finally, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Lin-Lin
failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by the
Chinese government, or that the government would consent or acquiesce to his torture. 
For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
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